at the principal mass of Koutousoff's
army D D should have moved to E E in order to fall on the right of the
French, whose army would have been certainly destroyed if it had been
anticipated at C; for everybody knows in what a state it was while thus
fifteen hundred miles from its true base.

There was the same combination at Jemmapes, where Dumouriez, by
outflanking the Austrian left, instead of attacking their right, would
have entirely cut them off from the Rhine.

At the battle of Leuthen Frederick overwhelmed the Austrian left, which
was in the direction of their line of retreat; and for this reason the
right wing was obliged to take refuge in Breslau, where it capitulated a
few days later.

In such cases there is no cause for hesitation. The decisive point is
that wing of the enemy which is nearest his line of retreat, and this
line you must seize while protecting your own.

When an enemy has one or two lines of retreat perpendicular to and
behind his position of battle, it will generally be best to attack the
center, or that wing where the obstacles of the ground shall be the
least favorable for the defense; for in such a case the first
consideration is to gain the battle, without having in view the total
destruction of the enemy. That depends upon the relative numerical
strength, the _morale_ of the two armies, and other circumstances, with
reference to which no fixed rules can be laid down.

Finally, it happens sometimes that an army succeeds in seizing the
enemy's line of retreat before fighting a battle, as Napoleon did at
Marengo, Ulm, and Jena. The decisive point having in such case been
secured by skillful marches before fighting, it only remains to prevent
the enemy from forcing his way through your line. You can do nothing
better than fight a parallel battle, as there is no reason for
maneuvering against one wing more than the other. But for the enemy who
is thus cut off the case is very different. He should certainly strike
most heavily in the direction of that wing where he can hope most
speedily to regain his proper line of retreat; and if he throws the mass
of his forces there, he may save at least a large portion of them. All
that he has to do is to determine whether this decisive effort shall be
toward the right or the left.

It is proper for me to remark that the passage of a great river in the
presence of a hostile army is sometimes an exceptional case to which the
general rules will not a