SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR.

ON THE FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE.

Happening to be in Paris, near the end of 1851, a distinguished person
did me the honor to ask my opinion as to whether recent improvements in
fire-arms would cause any great modifications in the manner of making
war.

I replied that they would probably have an influence upon the details of
tactics, but that, in great strategic operations and the grand
combinations of battles, victory would, now as ever, result from the
application of the principles which had led to the success of great
generals in all ages,--of Alexander and Caesar as well as of Frederick
and Napoleon. My illustrious interlocutor seemed to be completely of my
opinion.

The heroic events which have recently occurred near Sebastopol have not
produced the slightest change in my opinion. This gigantic contest
between two vast intrenched camps, occupied by entire armies and
mounting two thousand guns of the largest caliber, is an event without
precedent, which will have no equal in the future; for the circumstances
which produced it cannot occur again.

Moreover, this contest of cannon with ramparts, bearing no resemblance
to regular pitched battles fought in the center of a continent, cannot
influence in any respect the great combinations of war, nor even the
tactics of battles.

The bloody battles of the Alma and Inkermann, by giving evidence of the
murderous effect of the new fire-arms, naturally led me to investigate
the changes which it might be necessary to make on this account in the
tactics for infantry.

I shall endeavor to fulfill this task in a few words, in order to
complete what was published on this point twenty years ago in the
Summary of the Art of War.

The important question of the influence of musketry-fire in battles is
not new: it dates from the reign of Frederick the Great, and
particularly from the battle of Mollwitz, which he gained (it was said)
because his infantry-soldiers, by the use of cylindrical rammers in
loading their muskets, were able to fire three shots per minute more
than their enemies.[55] The discussion which arose at this epoch between
the partisans of the shallow and deep orders of formation for troops is
known to all military students.

The system of deployed lines in three ranks was adopted for the
infantry; the cavalry, formed in two ranks, and in the order of battle,
was deployed upon the wings, or a part was held in reserve.