ng the front of each line. The army camped
together, marching by lines or by wings; and, as there were two cavalry
wings and two infantry wings, if the march was by wings four columns
were thus formed. When they marched by lines, (which was specially
applicable to flank movements,) two columns were formed, unless, on
account of local circumstances, the cavalry or a part of the infantry
had camped in a third line,--which was rare.

This method simplified logistics very much, since it was only necessary
to give such orders as the following:--"The army will move in such
direction, by lines or by wings, by the right or by the left." This
monotonous but simple formation was seldom deviated from; and no better
could have been devised as war was carried on in those days.

The French attempted something new at Minden, by forming as many columns
as brigades, and opening roads to bring them to the front in line,--a
simple impossibility.

If the labor of staff officers was diminished by this method of camping
and marching by lines, it must be evident that if such a system were
applied to an army of one hundred thousand or one hundred and fifty
thousand men, there would be no end to the columns, and the result would
be the frequent occurrence of routs like that of Rossbach.

The French Revolution introduced the system of divisions, which broke up
the excessive compactness of the old formation, and brought upon the
field fractions capable of independent movement on any kind of ground.
This change was a real improvement,--although they went from one extreme
to the other, by returning nearly to the legionary formation of the
Romans. These divisions, composed usually of infantry, artillery, and
cavalry, maneuvered and fought separately. They were very much extended,
either to enable them to subsist without the use of depots, or with an
absurd expectation of prolonging the line in order to outflank that of
the enemy. The seven or eight divisions of an army were sometimes seen
marching on the same number of roads, ten or twelve miles distant from
each other; the head-quarters was at the center, with no other support
than five or six small regiments of cavalry of three hundred or four
hundred men each, so that if the enemy concentrated the mass of his
forces against one of these divisions and beat it, the line was pierced,
and the general-in-chief, having no disposable infantry reserve, could
do nothing but order a retreat to rally his