f the line of defense. What was the
result? His right, although supported by the mountains of the Tyrol, was
beaten at Trent. Bonaparte then fell upon the rear of his left, and
destroyed that at Bassano and Mantua.

When the Archduke Charles gave way before the first efforts of the
French armies in 1796, would he have saved Germany by an eccentric
movement? Was not the salvation of Germany due to his concentric
retreat? At last Moreau, who had moved with a very extended line of
isolated divisions, perceived that this was an excellent system for his
own destruction, if he stood his ground and fought or adopted the
alternative of retreating. He concentrated his scattered troops, and all
the efforts of the enemy were fruitless in presence of a mass which it
was necessary to watch throughout the whole length of a line of two
hundred miles. Such examples must put an end to further discussion.[31]

There are two cases in which divergent retreats are admissible, and then
only as a last resource. First, when an army has experienced a great
defeat in its own country, and the scattered fragments seek protection
within the walls of fortified places. Secondly, in a war where the
sympathies of the whole population are enlisted, each fraction of the
army thus divided may serve as a nucleus of assembly in each province;
but in a purely methodical war, with regular armies, carried on
according to the principles of the art, divergent retreats are simply
absurd.

There is still another strategical consideration as to the direction of
a retreat,--to decide when it should be made perpendicularly to the
frontier and toward the interior of the country, or when it should be
parallel to the frontier. For example, when Marshal Soult gave up the
line of the Pyrenees in 1814, he had to choose one of two directions for
his retreat,--either by way of Bordeaux toward the interior of France,
or by way of Toulouse parallel to the frontier formed by the Pyrenees.
In the same way, when Frederick retired from Moravia, he marched toward
Bohemia instead of returning to Silesia.

These parallel retreats are often to be preferred, for the reason that
they divert the enemy from a march upon the capital of the state and the
center of its power. The propriety of giving such a direction to a
retreat must be determined by the configuration of the frontiers, the
positions of the fortresses, the greater or less space the army may
have for its marches, and the f