It is recommended to the
careful attention of young officers. But, while admitting the
possibility of success for a great descent upon a coast so near as the
English to Boulogne, what results should be expected if this armada had
had a long sea-voyage to make? How could so many small vessels be kept
moving, even for two days and nights? To what chances of ruin would not
so many frail boats be exposed in navigating the open seas! Moreover,
the artillery, munitions of war, equipments, provisions, and fresh water
that must be carried with this multitude of men require immense labor in
preparation and vast means of transportation.

Experience has shown clearly the difficulties attending such an
expedition, even for thirty thousand men. From known facts, it is
evident that a descent can be made with this number of men in four
cases:--1st, against colonies or isolated possessions; 2d, against
second-rate powers which cannot be immediately supported from abroad;
3d, for the purpose of effecting a temporary diversion, or to capture a
position which it is important to hold for a time; 4th, to make a
diversion, at once political and military, against a state already
engaged in a great war, whose troops are occupied at a distance from the
point of the descent.

It is difficult to lay down rules for operations of this character.
About the only recommendations I can make are the following. Deceive
the enemy as to the point of landing; choose a spot where the vessels
may anchor in safety and the troops be landed together; infuse as much
activity as possible into the operation, and take possession of some
strong point to cover the development of the troops as they land; put on
shore at once a part of the artillery, to give confidence and protection
to the troops that have landed.

A great difficulty in such an operation is found in the fact that the
transports can never get near the beach, and the troops must be landed
in boats and rafts,--which takes time and gives the enemy great
advantages. If the sea is rough, the men to be landed are exposed to
great risks; for what can a body of infantry do, crowded in boats,
tossed about by the waves, and ordinarily rendered unfit by sea-sickness
for the proper use of their arms?

I can only advise the party on the defensive not to divide his forces
too much by attempting to cover every point. It is an impossibility to
line the entire coast with batteries and battalions for its defense; but