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f 1797. Obliged as he was to leave a corps of fifteen thousand men in the valley of the Adige to observe the Tyrol while he was operating toward the Noric Alps, he preferred to draw this corps to his aid, at the risk of losing temporarily his line of retreat, rather than leave the parts of his army disconnected and exposed to defeat in detail. Persuaded that he could be victorious with his army united, he apprehended no particular danger from the presence of a few hostile detachments upon his communications. Great movable and temporary detachments are made for the following reasons:-- 1. To compel your enemy to retreat to cover his line of operations, or else to cover your own. 2. To intercept a corps and prevent its junction with the main body of the enemy, or to facilitate the approach of your own reinforcements. 3. To observe and hold in position a large portion of the opposing army, while a blow is struck at the remainder. 4. To carry off a considerable convoy of provisions or munitions, on receiving which depended the continuance of a siege or the success of any strategic enterprise, or to protect the march of a convoy of your own. 5. To make a demonstration to draw the enemy in a direction where you wish him to go, in order to facilitate the execution of an enterprise in another direction. 6. To mask, or even to invest, one or more fortified places for a certain time, with a view either to attack or to keep the garrison shut up within the ramparts. 7. To take possession of an important point upon the communications of an enemy already retreating. However great may be the temptation to undertake such operations as those enumerated, it must be constantly borne in mind that they are always secondary in importance, and that the essential thing is to be successful at the decisive points. A multiplication of detachments must, therefore, be avoided. Armies have been destroyed for no other reason than that they were not kept together. We will here refer to several of these enterprises, to show that their success depends sometimes upon good fortune and sometimes upon the skill of their designer, and that they often fail from faulty execution. Peter the Great took the first step toward the destruction of Charles XII. by causing the seizure, by a strong detachment, of the famous convoy Lowenhaupt was bring
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