extended
position. It would be absurd to pretend that a French army retiring from
Moscow to the Niemen without supplies of provisions, in want of cavalry
and draft horses, could effect the movement in the same good order and
with the same steadiness as a Russian army, well provided with every
thing necessary, marching in its own country, and covered by an immense
number of light cavalry.

There are five methods of arranging a retreat:--

The first is to march in a single mass and upon one road.

The second consists in dividing the army into two or three corps,
marching at the distance of a day's march from each other, in order
to avoid confusion, especially in the _materiel_.

The third consists in marching upon a single front by several roads
nearly parallel and having a common point of arrival.

The fourth consists in moving by constantly converging roads.

The fifth, on the contrary, consists in moving along diverging
roads.

I have nothing to say as to the formation of rear-guards; but it is
taken for granted that a good one should always be prepared and well
sustained by a portion of the cavalry reserves. This arrangement is
common to all kinds of retreats, but has nothing to do with the
strategic relations of these operations.

An army falling back in good order, with the intention of fighting as
soon as it shall have received expected reinforcements or as soon as it
shall have reached a certain strategic position, should prefer the first
method, as this particularly insures the compactness of the army and
enables it to be in readiness for battle almost at any moment, since it
is simply necessary to halt the heads of columns and form the remainder
of the troops under their protection as they successively arrive. An
army employing this method must not, however, confine itself to the
single main road, if there are side-roads sufficiently near to be
occupied which may render its movements more rapid and secure.

When Napoleon retired from Smolensk, he used the second method, having
the portions of his army separated by an entire march. He made therein a
great mistake, because the enemy was not following upon his rear, but
moving along a lateral road which brought him in a nearly perpendicular
direction into the midst of the separated French corps. The three fatal
days of Krasnoi were the result. The employment of this method being
chiefly to avoid incumbering the