of many remarkable retreats. That
of Antony, driven out of Media, was more painful than glorious. That of
the Emperor Julian, harassed by the same Parthians, was a disaster. In
more recent days, the retreat of Charles VIII. to Naples, when he passed
by a corps of the Italian army at Fornovo, was an admirable one. The
retreat of M. de Bellisle from Prague does not deserve the praises it
has received. Those executed by the King of Prussia after raising the
siege of Olmutz and after the surprise at Hochkirch were very well
arranged; but they were for short distances. That of Moreau in 1796,
which was magnified in importance by party spirit, was creditable, but
not at all extraordinary. The retreat of Lecourbe from Engadin to
Altorf, and that of Macdonald by Pontremoli after the defeat of the
Trebbia, as also that of Suwaroff from the Muttenthal to Chur, were
glorious feats of arms, but partial in character and of short duration.
The retreat of the Russian army from the Niemen to Moscow--a space of
two hundred and forty leagues,--in presence of such an enemy as Napoleon
and such cavalry as the active and daring Murat commanded, was certainly
admirable. It was undoubtedly attended by many favorable circumstances,
but was highly deserving of praise, not only for the talent displayed by
the generals who directed its first stages, but also for the admirable
fortitude and soldierly bearing of the troops who performed it. Although
the retreat from Moscow was a bloody catastrophe for Napoleon, it was
also glorious for him and the troops who were at Krasnoi and the
Beresina,--because the skeleton of the army was saved, when not a single
man should have returned. In this ever-memorable event both parties
covered themselves with glory.

The magnitude of the distances and the nature of the country to be
traversed, the resources it offers, the obstacles to be encountered, the
attacks to be apprehended, either in rear or in flank, superiority or
inferiority in cavalry, the spirit of the troops, are circumstances
which have a great effect in deciding the fate of retreats, leaving out
of consideration the skillful arrangements which the generals may make
for their execution.

A general falling back toward his native land along his line of
magazines and supplies may keep his troops together and in good order,
and may effect a retreat with more safety than one compelled to subsist
his army in cantonments, finding it necessary to occupy an