actively as possible, while a detachment makes an attempt at the
gorge. Hesitancy and delay in such a case are worse than the most
daring rashness.

Those gymnastic exercises are very useful which prepare soldiers for
escalades and passing obstacles; and the engineers may with great
advantage give their attention to providing means for facilitating the
passage of the ditches of field-works and climbing their parapets.

Among all the arrangements in cases of this kind of which I have read,
none are better than those for the assault of Warsaw and the intrenched
camp of Mayence. Thielke gives a description of Laudon's dispositions
for attacking the camp of Buntzelwitz, which, although not executed, is
an excellent example for instruction. The attack of Warsaw may be cited
as one of the finest operations of this sort, and does honor to Marshal
Paskevitch and the troops who executed it. As an example not to be
followed, no better can be given than the arrangements made for
attacking Dresden in 1813.

Among attacks of this class may be mentioned the memorable assaults or
escalades of Port Mahon in 1756, and of Berg-op-zoom in 1747,--both
preceded by sieges, but still brilliant _coups de main_, since in
neither case was the breach sufficiently large for a regular assault.

Continuous intrenched lines, although seeming to have a better
interconnection than lines of detached works, are more easily carried,
because they may be several leagues in extent, and it is almost
impossible to prevent an enemy from breaking through them at some point.
The capture of the lines of Mayence and Wissembourg, which are described
in the History of the Wars of the Revolution, (Chapters XXI. and XXII.,)
and that of the lines of Turin by Eugene of Savoy in 1706, are excellent
lessons for study.

This famous event at Turin, which has been so often referred to, is so
familiar to all readers that it is unnecessary to recall the details of
it; but I cannot pass it by without remarking how easily the victory was
bought and how little it should have been expected. The strategic plan
was certainly admirable; and the march from the Adige through Piacenza
to Asti by the right bank of the Po, leaving the French on the Mincio,
was beautifully arranged, but its execution was exceedingly slow. When
we examine the operations near Turin, we must confess that the victors
owed more to their good fortune than to their wisdom. It required no
great ef