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of words and upon definitions; others have censured where they but imperfectly understood; and others have, by the light of certain important events, taken it upon themselves to deny my fundamental principles, without inquiring whether the conditions of the case which might modify the application of these principles were such as were supposed, or without reflecting that, even admitting what they claimed to be true, a single exception cannot disprove a rule based upon the experience of ages and upon natural principles. In opposition to my maxims upon interior lines, some have quoted the famous and successful march of the allies upon Leipsic. This remarkable event, at first glance, seems to stagger the faith of those who believe in principles. At best, however, it is but one of those exceptional cases from which nothing can be inferred in the face of thousands of opposed instances. Moreover, it is easy to show that, far from overthrowing the maxims it has been brought to oppose, it will go to establish their soundness. Indeed, the critics had forgotten that in case of a considerable numerical superiority I recommended double lines of operations as most advantageous, particularly when concentric and arranged to combine an effort against the enemy at the decisive moment. Now, in the allied armies of Schwarzenberg, Bluecher, Bernadotte, and Benningsen, this case of decided superiority is found. The inferior army, to conform to the principles of this chapter, should have directed its efforts against one of the extremities of his adversary, and not upon the center as it did: so that the events quoted against me are doubly in my favor. Moreover, if the central position of Napoleon between Dresden and the Oder was disastrous, it must be attributed to the misfortunes of Culm, Katzbach, and Dennewitz,--in a word, to faults of execution, entirely foreign to the principles in question. What I propose is, to act offensively upon the most important point with the greater part of the forces, but upon the secondary points to remain on the defensive, in strong positions or behind a river, until the decisive blow is struck, and the operation ended by the total defeat of an essential part of the army. Then the combined efforts of the whole army may be directed upon other points. Whenever the secondary armies are exposed to a decisive shock during the absence of the mass of the army, the system is not understood; and this was what hap
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