y, cut off from its communications and forced upon
the Baltic, is another proof of this truth.

If the Prince of Coburg had acted with ability, he could easily have
made Pichegru suffer for this audacious maneuver, which was performed a
month before Jourdan was prepared to follow it up.

The center of the grand Austrian army intended to act upon the offensive
was before Landrecies; the army was composed of one hundred and six
battalions and one hundred and fifty squadrons; upon its right flank
Flanders was covered by the corps d'armee of Clairfayt, and upon the
left Charleroi was covered by that of the Prince de Kaunitz. The gain of
a battle before Landrecies opened its gates; and upon General Chapuis
was found a plan of the diversion in Flanders: only _twelve battalions_
were sent to Clairfayt. A long time afterward, and after the French were
known to have been successful, the corps of the Duke of York marched to
Clairfayt's relief; but what was the use of the remainder of the army
before Landrecies, after it was obliged by a loss of force to delay
invasion? The Prince of Coburg threw away all the advantages of his
central position, by allowing the French to concentrate in Belgium and
to beat all his large detachments in detail.

Finally, the army moved, leaving a division at Cateau, and a part having
been sent to the Prince de Kaunitz at Charleroi. If, instead of dividing
this grand army, it had been directed upon Turcoing, there would have
been concentrated there one hundred battalions and one hundred and
forty squadrons; and what must then have been the result of this famous
diversion of Pichegru, cut off from his own frontiers and shut up
between the sea and two fortresses?

The plan of invasion adopted by the French had not only the radical
error of exterior lines: it also failed in execution. The diversion on
Courtray took place on April 26, and Jourdan did not arrive at Charleroi
till the 3d of June,--more than a month afterward. Here was a splendid
opportunity for the Austrians to profit by their central position. If
the Prussian army had maneuvered by its right and the Austrian army by
its left,--that is, both upon the Meuse,--the state of affairs would
have been different. By establishing themselves in the center of a line
of scattered forces they could have prevented the junction of the
different fractions. It may be dangerous in a battle to attack the
center of a close line of troops when it can be simul