ws the respective situations of
the two parties. A and A A indicate the front of operations of the
armies of the Rhine and of the reserve; B and B B, that of Kray and
Melas; C C C C, the passes of the Saint-Bernard, of the Simplon, of the
Saint-Gothard, and of the Splugen; D indicates the two lines of
operations of the army of the reserve; E, the two lines of retreat of
Melas; H J K, the French divisions preserving their line of retreat. It
may thus be seen that Melas is cut off from his base, and that, on the
contrary, the French general runs no risk, since he preserves all his
communications with the frontiers and with his secondary lines.
[Illustration: Fig. 3. THE STRATIGIC FIELD OF 1806.]
The analysis of the memorable events just sketched shows clearly the
importance of a proper selection of lines of maneuver in military
operations. Indeed, discretion on this point may repair the disasters of
defeat, destroy the advantages of an adversary's victory, render his
invasion futile, or assure the conquest of a province.
By a comparison of the combinations and results of the most noted
campaigns, it will be seen that the lines of operations which have led
to success have been established in conformity to the fundamental
principle already alluded to,--viz.: that _simple and interior lines
enable a general to bring into action, by strategic movements, upon the
important point, a stronger force than the enemy_. The student may also
satisfy himself that those which have failed contained faults opposed to
this principle. An undue number of lines divides the forces, and permits
fractions to be overwhelmed by the enemy.
MAXIMS ON LINES OF OPERATIONS.
From the analysis of all the events herein referred to, as well as from
that of many others, the following maxims result:--
1. If the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisive
point of the theater of operations the greatest possible force, the
choice of the line of operations, being the primary means of attaining
this end, may be regarded as the fundamental idea in a good plan of a
campaign. Napoleon proved this by the direction he gave his armies in
1805 on Donauwerth and in 1806 on Gera,--maneuvers that cannot be too
much studied by military men.
Of course, it is impossible to sketch in advance the whole campaign. The
objective point will be determined upon in advance, the general plan to
be followed to attain it, and the first enterprise to be
|