ses about Mantua for eight months.
In 1813 Dresden was his pivot.
Pivots of maneuver are detachments of troops left to guard points which
it is essential to hold, while the bulk of the army proceeds to the
fulfillment of some important end; and when this is accomplished the
pivot of maneuver ceases to exist. Thus, Ney's corps was the pivot of
Napoleon's maneuver by Donauwerth and Augsburg to cut Mack from his line
of retreat. A pivot of operations, on the contrary, is a material point
of both strategical and tactical importance, serves as a point of
support and endures throughout a campaign.
The most desirable quality of a line of defense is that it should be as
short as possible, in order to be covered with facility by the army if
it is compelled to take the defensive. It is also important that the
extent of the strategic front should not be so great as to prevent the
prompt concentration of the fractions of the army upon an advantageous
point.
The same does not altogether apply to the front of operations; for if it
be too contracted it would be difficult for an army on the offensive to
make strategic maneuvers calculated to produce great results, since a
short front could be easily covered by the defensive army. Neither
should the front of operations be too extended. Such a front is
unsuitable for offensive operations, as it would give the enemy, if not
a good line of defense, at least ample space to escape from the results
of a strategic maneuver even if well planned. Thus, the beautiful
operations of Marengo, Ulm, and Jena could not have produced the same
results upon a theater of the magnitude of that of the Russian War in
1812, since the enemy, even if cut off from his line of retreat, could
have found another by adopting a new zone of operations.
The essential conditions for every strategic position are that it should
be more compact than the forces opposed, that all fractions of the army
should have sure and easy means of concentrating, free from the
intervention of the enemy. Thus, for forces nearly equal, all central or
interior positions would be preferable to exterior ones, since the front
in the latter case would necessarily be more extended and would lead to
a dangerous division of force. Great mobility and activity on the part
of the troops occupying these positions will be a strong element of
security or of superiority over the enemy, since it renders possible
rapid concentration at different and
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