resuming the battle can be executed, and there is no
resource but in ignominious flight.

Nations with powerful imaginations are particularly liable to panics;
and nothing short of strong institutions and skillful leaders can remedy
it. Even the French, whose military virtues when well led have never
been questioned, have often performed some quick movements of this kind
which were highly ridiculous. We may refer to the unbecoming panic which
pervaded the infantry of Marshal Villars after having gained the battle
of Friedlingen, in 1704. The same occurred to Napoleon's infantry after
the victory of Wagram and when the enemy was in full retreat. A still
more extraordinary case was the flight of the 97th semi-brigade, fifteen
hundred strong, at the siege of Genoa, before a platoon of cavalry. Two
days afterward these same men took Fort Diamond by one of the most
vigorous assaults mentioned in modern history.

Still, it would seem to be easy to convince brave men that death comes
more quickly and more surely to those who fly in disorder than to those
who remain together and present a firm front to the enemy, or who rally
promptly when their lines have been for the instant broken.

In this respect the Russian army may be taken as a model by all others.
The firmness which it has displayed in all retreats is due in equal
degrees to the national character, the natural instincts of the
soldiers, and the excellent disciplinary institutions. Indeed, vivacity
of imagination is not always the cause of the introduction of disorder:
the want of the habit of order often causes it, and the lack of
precautions on the part of the generals to maintain this order
contributes to it. I have often been astonished at the indifference of
most generals on this point. Not only did they not deign to take the
slightest precaution to give the proper direction to small detachments
or scattered men, and fail to adopt any signals to facilitate the
rallying in each division of the fractions which may be scattered in a
momentary panic or in an irresistible charge of the enemy, but they were
offended that any one should think of proposing such precautions. Still,
the most undoubted courage and the most severe discipline will often be
powerless to remedy a great disorder, which might be in a great degree
obviated by the use of rallying-signals for the different divisions.
There are, it is true, cases where all human resources are insufficient
for the mai