process * * * [A penal
statute must set up] ascertainable standards of guilt. [So that] men of
common intelligence * * * [are not] required to guess at * * * [its]
meaning," either as to persons within the scope of the act or as to
applicable tests to ascertain guilt.[809]

Defective by these tests and therefore violative of due process is a
statute providing that any person not engaged in any lawful occupation,
known to be a member of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who
has been convicted at least three times of being a disorderly person, or
who has been convicted of any crime in this or any other State, is a
gangster and subject to fine or imprisonment. Pointing to specific
shortcomings of this act, the Supreme Court observed that "* * * neither
[at] common law, * * * nor anywhere in the language of the law is there
[to be found any] definition of the word, * * * 'gang'." The State
courts, in adopting dictionary definitions of that term, were not to be
viewed as having intended to give "gangster" a meaning broad enough to
include anyone who had not been convicted of a specified crime or of
disorderly conduct as set out in the statute, or to limit its meaning to
the field covered by the words that they found in a dictionary ("roughs,
thieves, criminals"). Application of the latter interpretation would
include some obviously not within the statute and would exclude some
plainly covered by it. Moreover, the expression, "known to be a member,"
is ambiguous; and not only permits a doubt as to whether actual or
putative association is meant, but also fails to indicate what
constitutes membership or how one may join a gang. In conclusion, the
Supreme Court declared that if on its face a challenged statute is
repugnant to the due process clause, specification of details of the
offense intended to be charged would not serve to validate it; for it is
the statute, not the accusation under it, that prescribes the rule to
govern conduct and warns against transgression.[810] In contrast, the
Court sustained as neither too vague nor indefinite a State law which
provided for commitment of a psychopathic personality by probate action
akin to a lunacy proceeding, and which was construed by the State court
as including those persons who, by habitual course of misconduct in
sexual matters, have evidenced utter lack of power to control their
sexual impulses and are likely to inflict injury. The underlying
conditions, i.e., hab