decision, the accused, an
18-year-old Italian immigrant, unable to understand the English
language, was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment on
a plea of guilty when, notwithstanding a recital in the record that he
was arraigned in open court and advised through interpreters, one of
whom was the arresting officer, of the meaning and effect of a "guilty"
plea, and that he signed a statement waiving a jury trial and pleading
guilty, the waiver was not in fact signed by him and no plea of guilty
actually had been entered.

In disposing of more recent cases embracing right to counsel as an
issue, the Court, either with or without citation of Betts _v._ Brady,
has consistently applied the fair trial doctrine. Thus, the absence of
counsel competent to advise a 15-year-old Negro boy of his rights was
one of several factors operating in Haley _v._ Ohio[845] to negative the
propriety of admitting in evidence a confession to murder and
contributing to the conclusion that the boy's conviction had resulted
from proceedings that were unfair. Dividing again on the same issues in
which they were in disagreement in Foster _v._ Illinois;[846] namely,
the applicability of Amendment Six to State criminal prosecutions and
the merits of the fair trial doctrine as expounded in Betts _v._ Brady,
five Justices in Bute _v._ Illinois[847] ruled that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a State court to
tender assistance of counsel, before accepting a plea of guilty to a
charge of indecent liberties with female children, the maximum penalty
for which is 20 years, from a 57-year-old man who was not a lawyer and
who received from the Court an explanation of the consequences and
penalties resulting from such plea. Unanimity was subsequently regained
in Wade _v._ Mayo[848] in which the Justices had before them the plight
of an 18-year-old boy, convicted on the charge of breaking and entering,
who was described by a federal district court as not a stranger in
court, having been convicted of prior offenses, but as still unfamiliar
with court procedure and not capable of representing himself adequately.
On the strength of these and other findings, the Supreme Court held that
where one charged with crime is by reason of age, ignorance, or mental
incapacity incapable of defending himself, even in a prosecution of a
relatively simple nature, the refusal of a State trial court to appoint
counsel at his reques