cause the victim had a legal grievance against the police, but because
declarations procured by torture are not premises from which a civilized
forum will infer guilt."[891] In Malinski _v._ New York,[892] however,
although in the opinion of four Justices there was conflicting evidence
as to the involuntary character of the confessions used, the Court
nevertheless overturned a conviction sustained by New York
tribunals.[893] Without finding it necessary to determine whether
succeeding oral and written confessions were the product of the coercion
"admittedly" applied in extracting an initial oral confession,[894] the
Court held that, even though other evidence might have sufficed to
convict the accused and notwithstanding the fact that the initial oral
confession was never put in evidence, the repeated indirect reference to
its content at the trial plus the failure to warn the jury not to
consider it as evidence[895] invalidated the proceeding giving rise to
the verdict.[896]

Of the remaining cases involving the issue of self-incrimination,
Adamson _v._ California[897] is especially significant because it
represents the high water mark of dissent in support of the contention
that the Bill of Rights, originally operative only against the Federal
Government, became limitations on State action by virtue of their
inclusion within the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Here, the Court, speaking through Justice Reed, declared that the
California law which provides that if an accused elects to take the
witness stand and testify, he must then be prepared to undergo
impeachment of his testimony, through disclosure of his previous
convictions, and which also permits him to avoid such disclosure by
remaining silent, subject to comment on his failure to testify by the
Court and prosecuting counsel, does not involve such a denial of due
process as to invalidate a conviction in a State court. Inasmuch as
California law "does not involve any presumption, rebuttable or
irrebuttable, either of guilt or of the truth of any fact," and does not
alter the burden of proof, which rests upon the State, nor the
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, it does not prevent
the accused from enjoying a fair trial, which is all that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. Relying upon
Twining _v._ New Jersey[898] and Palko _v._ Connecticut,[899] the Court
reiterated that the "due process clause of the Fou