of the first section of the Amendment." In the instant
case, the majority opinion, according to Justice Black, "reasserts a
constitutional theory spelled out in Twining _v._ New Jersey, * * * that
this Court is endowed by the Constitution with boundless power under
'natural law' periodically to expand and contract constitutional
standards to conform to the Court's conception of what at a particular
time constitutes 'civilized decency' and 'fundamental liberty and
justice.' * * * [This] 'natural law' formula, [he further contends]
* * * should be abandoned as an incongruous excrescence on our
Constitution. * * * [The] formula [is] itself a violation of our
Constitution, in that it subtly conveys to courts, at the expense of
legislatures, ultimate power over public policies in fields where no
specific provision of the Constitution limits legislative power." In
conclusion, Justice Black expresses his fears as to "the consequences of
the Court's practice of substituting its own concepts of decency and
fundamental justice for the language of the Bill of Rights * * *"[902]
In all but one of the remaining cases, the Court sided with the accused
and supported his contention that the confession on which his conviction
was based had been procured by methods contrary to the requirements of
due process. The conviction of murder of a Negro boy of fifteen was
reversed by five Justices in Haley _v._ Ohio[903] on the ground that his
confession, which contributed to the verdict, was involuntary, having
been obtained by the police after several hours of questioning
immediately after the boy was arrested, during which interval the youth
was without friends or legal counsel. After having had his confession
reduced to writing, the boy continued to be held _incommunicado_ for
three days before being arraigned. "The age of petitioner, the
[midnight] hours when he was grilled, the duration of his quizzing, the
fact that he had no friend or counsel to advise him, the callous
attitude of the police towards his rights combine to convince us," the
Court declared, "that this was a confession wrung from a child by means
which the law should not sanction."[904] The application of duress being
indisputed, a unanimous Court, in Lee _v._ Mississippi,[905] citing as
authority all the preceding cases beginning with Brown _v._ Mississippi,
held that "a conviction resulting from such use of a coerced confession,
however, is no less void because the accused
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