njoin the use, in State criminal proceedings against them in New Jersey
of evidences claimed to have been obtained by unlawful search by State
police. Said Justice Frankfurter, "If we were to sanction this
intervention, we would expose every State criminal prosecution to
insupportable disruption. Every question of procedural due process of
law--with its far flung and undefined range--would invite a flanking
movement against the system of State courts by resort to the federal
forum * * *"[932] The facts in the second case were as follows: state
officers, on the basis of "some information" that petitioner was selling
narcotics, entered his home and forced their way into his wife's
bedroom. When asked about two capsules lying on a bedroom table,
petitioner put them into his mouth and swallowed them. He was then taken
to a hospital, where an emetic was forced into his stomach with the
result that he vomited them up. Later they were offered in evidence
against him. Again Justice Frankfurter spoke for the Court, while
reiterating his preachments regarding the tolerance claimable by the
States under the Fourteenth Amendment[933] he held that methods
offensive to human dignity were ruled out by the due process
clause.[934] Justices Black and Douglas concurred in opinions in which
they seized the opportunity to reiterate once more their position in
Adamson _v._ California.[935]

Conviction Based on Perjured Testimony

When a conviction is obtained by the presentation of testimony known to
the prosecuting authorities to have been perjured, the constitutional
requirement of due process is not satisfied. That requirement "cannot be
deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a State has
contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is
but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a
deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony
known to be perjured. Such a contrivance * * * is as inconsistent with
the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result
by intimidation."[936] This principle, as originally announced, was no
more than a dictum uttered by the Court in disposing of Tom Mooney's
application for a writ of _habeas corpus_, filed almost eighteen years
after his conviction, and founded upon the contention that the verdict
of his guilt was made possible solely by perjured testimony knowingly
employed by the prosecutor who "deliberat