53]

When employed in the conduct of the trial, however, summary procedures
such as those examined in the preceding two decisions invariably elicit
judicial condemnation. Thus, when a Michigan judge proceeding as a
one-man grand jury concluded that a witness had given false and evasive
testimony, not on the basis of anything inherent in the testimony
itself, but at least in part upon its inconsistency with other testimony
given by a preceding witness, and immediately thereupon suspended his
investigation, and committed the witness to jail for contempt, such
summary commitment, in the absence of a showing that it was necessary to
prevent demoralization of the judge's authority, was held to constitute
a denial of due process. The guaranty of that clause forbids the
sentencing of an accused person to prison without a public trial; that
is, without a day in court, reasonable notice of the charges, and an
opportunity to be heard in one's defense by cross-examining other
witnesses, or by summoning witnesses to refute the charges against
him.[954]

On the other hand, when the alleged contempt is committed, not within
the confines of a secret grand jury proceeding, but in open court, is
readily observable by the presiding judge, and constitutes an open and
immediate threat to orderly judicial procedure and to the court's
authority, the offended tribunal is constitutionally empowered summarily
to punish without notice, testimony, or hearing. Thus in Fisher _v._
Pace,[955] albeit with the concurrence of only five Justices, the Court
sustained a Texas court's conviction for contempt, with progressive
increase of penalty from a $25 to $50 to $100 fine plus three days in
jail, of a trial attorney who, despite judicial admonition, persisted in
conveying to the jury, in a workmen's compensation case, information not
for their consideration. Conceding that "there must be adequate facts to
support an order for contempt," the majority declared that the Texas
appellate court's finding in the affirmative, after evaluation of the
facts, should not be overturned inasmuch as the Supreme Court, in
examining the transcript of the record, could not derive therefrom an
adequate picture of the courtroom scene nor discern therein "such
elements of misbehavior as expression, manner of speaking, bearing, and
attitude of * * * [the attorney]." The fact that the bench was guilty of
"mildly provocative language" was deemed insufficient to excuse the
c