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authority of the Uveges Case, accused's failure to request counsel, since it could be attributed to ignorance of his right thereto, was held not to constitute a waiver. Moreover, had the accused been granted the protection of counsel, the latter might have been able to prevent certain prejudicial rulings; namely, the introduction without objection of considerable hearsay testimony, the error of the trial judge in converting a prosecution witness into a defense witness, and finally, the injection of biased statements into the judge's comments to the jury. And of the same general pattern is the holding in Palmer _v._ Ashe,[854] another Pennsylvania case, involving a petitioner who alleged that, as a youth and former inmate at a mental institution, he was railroaded into prison for armed robbery without benefit of counsel, on the representation that he was charged only with breaking and entering. Reversing the State court's denial of petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus, the Court remanded the case, asserting that if petitioner's allegations were proven, he was entitled to counsel. On the other hand, it was held in Quicksall _v._ Michigan,[855] a State in which capital punishment does not exist, that a defendant who had received a life sentence on a plea of guilty entered without benefit of counsel, had "failed to sustain the burden of proving such disregard of fundamental fairness * * * as alone would * * * invalidate his sentence," not having convinced the State court that he was ignorant of his right to counsel, or that he had requested same, or that the consequences of his plea had been misrepresented to him. Also, in Gallegos _v._ Nebraska,[856] in which the petitioner had been convicted of manslaughter on a homicide charge, a similar conclusion was reached in the face of the petitioner's claim that the confession on the strength of which he was convicted had been obtained from him by mistreatment, prior to the assignment of counsel to him. Said the Court: "The Federal Constitution does not command a State to furnish defendants counsel as a matter of course. * * * Lack of counsel at State noncapital trials denies federal constitutional protection only when the absence results in a denial to accused of the essentials of justice."[857] By way of summation, the Court in Uveges _v._ Pennsylvania[858] offered the following comment on the conflicting views advanced by its members on this issue of right to c
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