erfected by requiring such
persons, as a condition to entering the State, to designate local agents
to accept service of process. Although a State does not have the power
to exclude individuals until such formal appointment of an agent has
been made,[700] it may, for example, declare that the use of its
highways by a nonresident is the equivalent of the appointment of the
State Registrar as agent for receipt of process in suits growing out of
motor vehicle accidents. However, a statute designating a State official
as the proper person to receive service of process in such litigation
must, to be valid, contain a provision making it reasonably probable
that a notice of such service will be communicated to the person sued.
If the statute imposed "either on the plaintiff himself, or upon the
official" designated to accept process "or some other, the duty of
communicating by mail or otherwise with the defendant" this requirement
is met; but if the act exacts no more than service of process on the
local agent, it is unconstitutional, notwithstanding that the defendant
may have been personally served in his own State. Not having been
directed by the statute, such personal service cannot supply
constitutional validity to the act or to service under it.[701]

Suits _in Personam_.--Restating the constitutional principles
currently applicable for determining whether individuals, resident and
nonresident, are suable in _in personam_ actions, the Supreme Court in
International Shoe Co. _v._ Washington,[702] recently declared that:
"Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgments _in
personam_ is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's
person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a
court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding
him. * * * But now * * *, due process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment _in personam_, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"

Suability of Foreign Corporations.--Until the enunciation in
1945 in International Shoe Co. _v._ Washington[703] of a "fair play and
substantial justice" doctrine, the exact scope of which cannot yet be
ascertained, the suability of foreign corporations had been determined
by utilization of the "presence" doctrin