erial
but which the appellate court considered material, was held to have been
deprived of his rights without due process of law.[751]

Sufficiency of Notice and Hearing.--Although the Supreme Court
has wavered on the question whether the granting of notice in
administrative proceedings, in cases in which the authorizing statute
does not expressly provide therefor, will satisfy the requirements of
due process,[752] in judicial proceedings it has almost consistently
declared that notice must be provided as an essential part of the
statutory provision and not as a mere matter of favor or grace.[753]
Also, the notice afforded must be adequate for the purpose. Thus, a
Texas statute providing for service of process by giving five days'
notice was held to be an insufficient notice to a Virginian who would
(at that time) have required four days' traveling to reach the place
where the court was held. Nor would this insufficiency of notice on a
nonresident be cured by the fact that under local practice there would
be several additional days before the case would be called for trial or
that the court would probably set aside a default judgment and permit a
defense when the nonresident arrived.[754] On the other hand, a statute
affording ten days' notice of the time for settlement of the account of
a personal representative in probate proceedings is not wanting in due
process of law as to a nonresident.[755] Adequacy, moreover, is no less
an essential attribute of a hearing than it is of notice; and, as the
preceding discussion has shown, unless a person involved in
administrative as well as judicial proceedings has received a hearing
that is both sufficient and fair and has been subjected to rulings amply
supported by the evidence introduced thereat, he will not be considered
to have been accorded due process.[756]

POWER OF STATES TO REGULATE PROCEDURE

Generally

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not control mere
forms of procedure in State courts or regulate practice therein.[757] A
State "is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance
with its own conception of policy and fairness unless in so doing it
offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."[758] Pursuant
to such plenary power, States have regulated the manner in which rights
may be enforced and wrongs remedied,[759] and, in connection therewith,
h