he rates were
confiscatory.[126] Subsequent cases sustaining rate orders of the
Federal Power Commission have not dealt explicitly with this point.[127]
The Court has said simply that a person assailing such an order "carries
the heavy burden of making a convincing showing that it is invalid
because it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences."[128]
There has been a division of opinion in the Supreme Court as to what
extent, if at all, the proceedings before military tribunals should be
reviewed by the courts for the purpose of determining compliance with
the due process clause. In In re Yamashita[129] the majority denied a
petition for certiorari and petitions for writs of _habeas corpus_ to
review the conviction of a Japanese war criminal by a military
commission sitting in the Philippine Islands. It held that since the
military commission, in admitting evidence to which objection was made,
had not violated any act of Congress, a treaty or a military command
defining its authority, its ruling on evidence and on the mode of
conducting the proceedings were not reviewable by the courts. Without
dissent, the Supreme Court in Hiatt _v._ Brown[130] reversed the
judgment of a lower court which had discharged a prisoner serving a
sentence imposed by a court-martial, because of errors whereby the
respondent had been deprived of due process of law. The Supreme Court
held that the Court below had erred in extending its review, for the
purpose of determining compliance with the due process clause, to such
matters as the propositions of law set forth in the staff judge
advocate's report, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
respondent's conviction, the adequacy of the pre-trial investigation,
and the competence of the law member and defense counsel. In summary,
Justice Clark wrote: "In this case the court-martial had jurisdiction of
the person accused and the offense charged, and acted within its lawful
powers. The correction of any errors it may have committed is for the
military authorities which are alone authorized to review its
decision."[131] Again in Johnson _v._ Eisentrager[132] the Supreme Court
overruled a lower court decision, which, in reliance upon the dissenting
opinion in the Yamashita Case, had held that the due process clause
required that the legality of the conviction of enemy alien belligerents
by military tribunals should be tested by the writ of _habeas corpus_.
ALIENS
To aliens who have n
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