_ even a little one has to know a
great deal, and to know it well. . . . The right solution imposes
itself; namely, the application, according to circumstances, of fixed
principles. . . . Incapacity and ignorance cannot be called
extenuating circumstances, for knowledge is within the reach of all"
(Marshal Foch); and in the words of Napoleon's own maxim: "The only way
to learn the art of war is to read and _re-read_ the campaigns of the
great captains."

THE "COMMON-SENSE" FALLACY.--The fallacy that warfare is "merely a
matter of common sense" has been exposed by Colonel G. F. R. Henderson,
in his contrast of the conduct of the American Civil War of 1861-1865,
when it was controlled by President Lincoln and his Cabinet in
Washington, and when it was handed over without reserve to a
professional soldier in the field (General Grant). Few mortals have
possessed "common sense" in greater abundance than Abraham Lincoln, and
yet he permitted interference with his generals' plans, which were
frequently brought to nought by such interference, and but for a like
hindrance of the Confederate generals by Jefferson Davis this
well-intentioned "common sense" would have been even more disastrous.
"Men who, aware of their ignorance, would probably have shrunk from
assuming charge of a squad of infantry in action had no hesitation
whatever in attempting to direct a mighty army" (Henderson, "Stonewall
Jackson").

In June, 1863, the Confederate Armies were scattered from Strasburg (in
the Valley) to Fredericksburg (in Spottsylvania); General Hooker,
commanding the Army of the Potomac in the field, begged to be allowed
to attack Lee's Corps in detail. Success was certain, but permission
was refused. The one and only idea of the Federal Government was to
keep the Army of the Potomac between Lee and the Federal Capital.

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THE "HIGHER RANKS" FALLACY.--The same writer has also protested
vehemently against the idea that the practice of strategy in the field
is confined to the higher ranks. "Every officer in charge of a
detached force or flying column, every officer who for the time being
has to act independently, every officer in charge of a patrol, is
constantly brought face to face with strategical considerations; and
success or failure, even where the force is insignificant, will depend
upon his familiarity with strategical principles" ("The Science of
War"). In the same way, General Sir E. B. Hamley, in "The Operations
of