be developed until the enemy is annihilated.

_Information and the Initiative_.--Much work requires to be done in the
air and on the land before the rival armies come face to face.
Aircraft and the independent cavalry (advanced mounted troops and fast
tanks detached from divisions for the purpose), endeavour to ascertain
whether, and if so in what locality and in what strength, troops are
being concentrated by the enemy. From information so obtained the
Headquarters Staff are able to conjecture the intentions and aims of
the enemy, and the extent to which their own intentions and aims have
been perceived by the enemy. After the enemy is encountered this
information is at the service of the Commander of the troops, but it
will generally require to be supplemented by fighting. On each side
the commander will be striving to obtain the _initiative_, to impose
his will upon his opponent, for the commander who loses the initiative
is compelled to conform to the plans and movements of his adversary,
instead of bringing into operation plans and movements better suited to
his own purposes. Each is scheming to obtain or retain the liberty of
manoeuvre, in the same way as, in the days of sailing ships, a naval
commander strove to get the "weather gauge" in every encounter.

The initiative won by the Strategy of one commander {27} is sometimes
wrested from him by the Tactics of his adversary. This was exemplified
at the _Battle of Salamanca_ (July 22, 1812). Wellington, the
generalissimo of the Anglo-Portuguese forces, had decided to withdraw
behind the River Tormes to the stronghold Ciudad Rodrigo, and had
dispatched his train to that centre. The French Commander (Marmont),
in his eagerness to intercept Wellington's line of retreat, moved part
of his force to the Heights of Miranda, thus threatening Wellington's
right and rear, but leaving a gap of two miles between the detached
force and his main army. Wellington noted the fresh disposition of
Marmont's army through his telescope, and exclaiming, "That will do!"
he abandoned all idea of the withdrawal which had been forced upon him
by Marmont's previous manoeuvres, and hurled part of his force against
the detached body (which was defeated before Marmont could send
assistance) and at the same time barred the progress of the main army,
which was forced to leave the field. Wellington afterwards declared,
"I never saw an army receive such a beating." If the Spanish Genera