in mind that General
Lee was badly served by his subordinate, and General Meade's success
was largely due to this factor. On the second day of Gettysburg (July
2, 1863), General J. B. Hood's 1st Division of General J. Longstreet's
I. Army Corps was deploying round the left of the Federal Army south of
the Round Tops. He saw a chance to strike and requested permission
from Longstreet. Hood's plan was the only one which gave a reasonable
chance of decisive victory with the troops available. Longstreet, in
obedience to the letter of his orders, but contrary to their spirit,
refused to sanction Hood's advance. Longstreet's failure to seize a
fleeting opportunity sounded the death-knell of the Confederate cause.

{46}

Burnside was defeated at _Fredericksburg_ (December 10-16, 1862) by
purely defensive tactics, but Lee had intended to follow up his victory
by a decisive counter-blow, which Burnside escaped by extricating the
Army of the Potomac before the blow fell. Success, even to the limited
degree achieved by Meade or Lee, seldom follows the adoption of purely
defensive tactics. "There is no such thing as an 'impregnable
position,' for any position the defence of which is merely passive is
bound to be carried at last by a manoeuvring enemy" (Marshal Foch).

THE OFFENSIVE BATTLE.--The Entirely Offensive system has been employed
by many of the greatest commanders, including Marlborough at _Blenheim_
(August 2, 1704), _Ramillies_ (May 23, 1706), and _Malplaquet_
(September 11, 1709); Frederick the Great, notably at _Leuthen_
(December 5, 1757); Napoleon, Wellington, and Grant, as also by the
Prussian generals at almost every engagement in the campaigns of 1866
and 1870-71. The disadvantage of the system is that lack of success
may entail not only a local disaster but the wreck and annihilation of
the whole army.

At the _Battle of Blenheim_ (August 2, 1704), Marlborough, "the
greatest captain of his age," had concentrated his forces with those of
Prince Eugene of Savoy the previous day and commanded an army of 56,000
men with 52 guns. He was confronted by the joint armies of Marshal
Tallard and the Elector of Bavaria, amounting to 60,000 men with 61
guns. It was necessary for Marlborough to attack before Villeroy
joined the enemy, or to withdraw until a more favourable opportunity
presented itself. The right flank of his opponents rested on high
hills, which were protected by detached posts, and the left fla