lions and 10
batteries in all had come into action against a whole French Corps, and
there were two French Corps within reach of the one engaged. Had these
"marched to the sound of the cannon," as Napoleon would have marched,
the 14th Prussian Division would have been unable to extricate itself
without complete disaster. At the _Battle of Worth_ (August 6, 1870)
the Prussian Crown Prince had expressed his intention not to engage the
French on that day. Yet the Advanced Guard of the V. Corps brought on
a battle into which the Bavarian Corps was perforce drawn. The Crown
Prince sent word for the action to be discontinued, but the advanced
troops were so seriously involved in the battle that reinforcements had
to be sent into action. Although tactically successful the battle was
out of accord with the settled plans of the Commander-in-Chief. In the
same way the Advanced Guard of the VII. Prussian Corps, contrary to the
letter and the spirit of the orders of the commander of the I. Army,
precipitated an action at _Colombey_ (August 14, 1870). Other troops
were drawn into the fight, and finally the whole of the I. Army was
engaged in a battle which its commander not only disapproved but had
expressly forbidden. The battle had no tactical or strategical
results, and heavy losses were sustained on both sides. "Precipitate
action of this kind prevents the troops being engaged in the most
advantageous manner. For when a small force is engaged against a
larger one it becomes necessary, as reinforcements arrive, to move them
up to support some point already hard pressed, and the whole force is
thus used up and disseminated, instead of being employed collectively
where an effective blow may be struck. Thus the direction of the fight
is surrendered to the enemy, as at Spicheren and Colombey. The French
positions were so strong that the German {110} reinforcements as they
arrived were frittered away in support of troops already engaged, and
the state of the latter during the action was frequently very critical.
At Colombey the battle resolved itself into a desperate struggle along
the front of the French position, where the Prussians made little
impression, while their losses considerably exceeded those inflicted on
the French" (Clery). It is thus seen that the commander of the
Advanced Guard must limit his aggressive action in accordance with his
instructions and with the tactical and strategical requirements of the
forc