furnished, if required to watch some special point, particularly at
night, or at the junction of roads converging towards the Piquet line,
at cross roads, etc., when they are out of sight of the sentries. The
Piquet will stand to arms, every man in his allotted place, an hour
before dawn, and will remain alert until the patrols (which are
invariably sent out about that time) have reported absence of movement
by the enemy. Outposts are generally relieved at dawn, so that the
force is doubled at the hour of danger. All troops in the Outpost Line
must entrench themselves, if posted as sentries, or in the Piquet or
Support positions, and must be ready at any moment to resist a sudden
attack. A detachment of Royal Engineers will usually be available to
superintend the consolidation of the main position.

DAY AND NIGHT WORK.--By day, the work of an Outpost Line will consist
in Reconnaissance of the approaches for some miles by the Aircraft and
mounted troops and cyclists, while infantry, with artillery and machine
guns, hold the Line of Resistance. By night, the mounted troops will
be withdrawn, except such "Cossack Posts" (standing patrols of mounted
troops) and "Vedettes" (mounted sentries), as it may be deemed
necessary to leave established in front of the line, while Aircraft
will have much difficulty in discerning movement. The whole work of
observation and resistance therefore falls on the infantry, who may be
in their day {138} position or may be withdrawn to the reverse slope of
a ridge, in order to obtain a sky line by night upon which to train
their rifles.

Neglect of the Principles of War is almost inevitably followed by
disaster, and Protection is the first of the Tactical Principles.
During the later stages of the Franco-Prussian War a French force of
the strength of a brigade was billeted in the _Chateau of Chambord_
(December 9, 1870), which stands in a large park, near Blois. No
outpost precautions were taken, and the Chateau was captured by two
companies of Prussian infantry. The minor disasters suffered by
British arms in the South African War were almost entirely due to
neglect of the warnings contained in the official text-books. In spite
of the established superiority of the Boers in mobility and vigilance
the most elementary precautions against surprise were frequently
neglected. At _Tweefontein_ (December 24, 1901) a force of Yeomanry
was surprised in an unprotected camp by a mobile force of