yards distance from
the objective, the assault being delivered at the conclusion of the
march. The Egyptian Army, under Arabi Pasha, fought steadily, and again
and again renewed the fight, after falling back {152} within their
entrenchments, but their flank was turned and the whole position
captured. The British loss was only 459 all ranks, and the Egyptians
lost upwards of 2,500 killed and wounded, the remaining 23,000 being
dispersed or captured. A daylight advance and assault of so strong a
position could not have been successfully carried through at so small a
cost to the attacking troops. In the South African War there were two
examples of the unsuccessful Night Attack. Major-General Gatacre essayed
a Night March followed by a Night Attack upon the Boers' position at
_Stormberg_ (December 10, 1899), but he was misled by his guides in
unknown ground and was himself surprised by the Boers and forced to
retire with a loss of over 700 officers and other ranks. On the
following day Lord Methuen delivered an attack upon Cronje's position
between the Upper Modder River and the Kimberley road. In a Night Attack
on _Magersfontein Hill_ (December 11, 1899) the Highland Brigade came
under heavy fire while still in assembly formation and lost its Brigadier
(A. G. Wauchope) and 750 officers and other ranks. In the later stages
of the South African War, however, Night Marches followed by Raids were
employed with marked success, particularly in the Eastern Transvaal in
November and December, 1901.

Except when the assaulting troops are already in position, it will be
necessary to choose Positions of Assembly and of Deployment, and to
precede the advance in the preliminary stages by lines of scouts, ahead
and on the flanks, within 100 yards of the following troops. On arrival
at the jumping-off place these advanced scouts will await the arrival of
the assaulting force, and they should be directed to mark the ground for
the various units. A scout from each Forward Platoon can thus mark the
inner flank on which his Platoon will rest, and the direction of the
whole line will be assured.

The troops will usually advance, during the earlier {153} stages, in
shallow columns on narrow frontages, at deploying intervals, and may
maintain this formation until the halted line of scouts is reached.
Owing to the frequent necessity for halts to correct intervals, etc., and
the inherent difficulties of movements by night in open form