lry to its legitimate duty" (Henderson
"Stonewall Jackson"). In the Russo-Japanese War a column of 500
Cossacks, under Colonel Madritov, made a bold raid on the
communications of the Japanese I. Army in the last days of April, 1904.
The raid involved a {118} ride of 240 miles and was carried out in
entire ignorance of the imminent attack upon General Zasulich's force
by the Japanese I. Army at the _Battle of the Yalu_ (May 1, 1904). On
arrival at his objective Colonel Madritov found nothing to attack, as
the base of the Japanese I. Army had been shifted from the Korean
frontier to a shorter sea base at the Yalu mouth. On his return he
found his General in disordered flight, and had his small force been
available at the Battle of the Yalu it could have protected the retreat
to Hamatan and Feng-hwang-cheng. Raids and attacks outside the centre
of operations, however daring, have no permanent value.

In the South African War a disaster to a Convoy at _Sannah's Post_, or
_Koorn Spruit_ (March 31, 1900), was caused by the absence of
precautions in front of a retreating force, the wagons being permitted
to enter a defile (the Spruit crossed the road at right-angles and was
held by the Boers) before the exit had been secured. Earlier in the
same campaign a Convoy of 800 wagons was lost at _Ramdam_ (February 13,
1900). An ambushed force of Boers killed all the transport animals and
the wagons were abandoned. No escort had been provided for the Convoy,
which entered the ambushed area without previous reconnaissance.
Throughout the South African War the activities of De Wet emphasised
the vulnerability of the Lines of Communications.

Where the tactical situation permits, arrangements should be made to
protect the Lines of Communications by offensive action. An engagement
may be invited in a suitable position, the protecting troops holding
the raiders with a Delaying Action while reinforcements are summoned to
converge on the battlefield for the purpose of surrounding and
exterminating the raiders.

{119}

THE REAR GUARD

A Rear Guard is essential to a force advancing in order to pick up the
stragglers, to keep off marauders, and to prevent surprise by an
energetic enemy who may detach a force for a surprise attack on the
rear of the advancing column.

But its most important work is the protection of a retreating force,
and this work will vary in difficulty with the freshness and enterprise
of the enemy and