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ground like Napoleon's, or blindness as to ground like his opponent's at both those battles, may play in Grand Tactics, that is, the art of generalship" (Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, "The Science of War"). The same was true of General R. E. Lee, particularly in the Wilderness Campaign, when it was not only the entrenchments but the natural features of the ground on which he relied in his defensive tactics. "His eye for ground must have been extraordinary. The campaign was fought over a very large area, an area of very close country, with few marked natural features; and yet in the midst of woods, jungles, and streams, with very little time at his disposal, he always seems to have selected positions than which none could have been stronger" (Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, "The Science of War"). EXAMPLES OF REAR GUARD WORK.--During the Retreat from Mons the Rear Guard of the II. Corps of the British Expeditionary Force delayed the pursuit by the daring and devotion of its cavalry and artillery, and by subordinating its plans to the interests of the Main Body enabled the Corps Commander (General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien) not only to throw off the pursuit but to effect a junction with the other wing of the British Army. The retreat took place after the First _Battle of Le Cateau_ (August 26, 1914), and during the period of the retreat the insecurity of the British Army through the breakdown of a co-operating force rendered it liable to disaster. But the moral of Marshal French and his commanders, the stubborn fighting instincts of the British race, and the excellence of the musketry training of the Regular Army in times of peace, prevented the retreat from becoming a rout. The care taken in training the troops in Fire Tactics, and particularly in reloading with "eyes on the mark and butts to the shoulder," was most abundantly justified. The accuracy and volume of the rifle fire deceived the enemy as to the nature of the troops employed against them, and the dismounted troops and infantry with their rifles were reported as "battalions of machine gunners." During the _Second Battle of the Somme_ (March, 1918), the British III, and V. Armies fought a series of Rear Guard battles, and the enemy's advance was made at a very heavy cost. "Units retreated stubbornly from one position to another as they found them turned and threatened with isolation; but at many points fierce engagements were fought, and whenever the enemy attemp
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