l
in alliance with Wellington had not, contrary to the most explicit
instructions, evacuated the Castle of Alba de Tormes (which commanded
the fords over which the French retreated), "not one-third of Marmont's
army would have escaped" (Napier).

As at Salamanca, where the liberty of manoeuvre which had been won by
the Strategy of Marmont was wrested from him by the Tactics of
Wellington, so at the final phase of the _First Battle of the Marne_
(September, 1914), the initiative was regained by tactical adroitness.
Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was
an inexhaustible supply of troops. To obtain a quick decision the
Germans went to every length. Of the main routes for the invasion of
France chosen for their armies, two led through the neutral territories
of Luxemburg and Belgium, and only one through France, and their
advance there broke {28} down, almost at the first, at the only point
where it was legitimately conducted, for the German armies failed to
pierce the French Front at the Gap of Charmes (Vosges), and their
defeat at the _Battle of Baccarat_ (August 25, 1914) led to the
decisive defeat at the First Battle of the Marne. They then abandoned,
for the moment, all hopes of a quick decision in a war of manoeuvre and
retiring to their prepared lines of defence on the Aisne, relied upon
methodically prepared and regularly constructed trench systems, and
upon the hand grenade, the trench mortar, and the other weapons of
close combat, for superiority in a long campaign of trench siege
warfare, which endured until the collapse of Russia in 1917 freed for
an offensive movement on the requisite scale in 1918 upwards of
1,500,000 men. At the _First Battle of the Marne_, the five German
armies, which were following up the Franco-British left and centre,
were extended from Amiens to Verdun, but on September 8, 1914, the
German I. Army (General von Kluck) was so placed by the impetuosity of
the march that a wide gap separated it from the remainder of the German
forces. To the north-west of Paris a new French Army, collected from
the Metropolitan garrison and from the south-eastern frontier, had been
assembled and pushed out in motor transports by the zeal and
intelligence of the Military Governor of Paris (General Gallieni); and
to avoid this menace to his flank and line of communications, and to
regain touch with the other German armies, one of which (under the
Crown Prince) was unsuc