under covering fire from
supporting troops; where the objective is the primary consideration,
security must be subordinated to the need of reaching the objective.
Against artillery fire, or long-range infantry fire, the formation
recommended by the text-books is small shallow columns, each on a
narrow front, such as platoons in fours or sections in file, arranged
on an irregular front, so that the range from the enemy's guns to each
is different. Troops coming suddenly under such fire will avoid
casualties more easily by moving forward and outwards in this way
rather than by remaining under such cover as may be improvised in a
position the exact range of which is obviously known to the enemy.
Against effective machine-gun or rifle fire deployment into line, or
into "arrowhead" formation with the flanks thrown well back, is
preferable to a single line extended at so many paces interval, as it
is scarcely more vulnerable and is infinitely easier to control.

In retiring, losses are generally heavier than in advancing, or in
maintaining a fire-fight from the position gained until a diversion by
supporting troops enables a further bound to be made. The enemy is
generally able to deliver a well-directed stream of lead against
retiring troops, mainly because he is less harassed by the return fire.
Retirements must therefore be carried out on the principle of alternate
bounds under covering fire of co-operating bodies, which withdraw, in
their turn, under covering fire from the troops they have protected.
{41} Such alternate retirements are the essence of rear-guard tactics,
but, although certain other phases of battle action justify the
withdrawal of troops, it must always be remembered that a position held
against counter-attack is better than a position captured by assault,
for it is a position that does not require to be assaulted. It is
often impossible to predict the value of resistance at a particular
point, and the fate of a nation may depend upon a platoon commander's
grit in holding on at all costs. In the campaign of 1814,
Brigadier-General Moreau was sent to the _Fortress of Soissons_, with
instructions to hold the town. His garrison consisted of about 1,200
all arms, with 20 guns. At 10.30 a.m. on March 2, the fortress was
bombarded by Winzingerode's Russians and Buelow's Prussians, and at 8
p.m. an assault was delivered. This was easily repulsed and a
counter-attack threw back the assailants to their own