en Germany's hour has struck," was his warning note, and
although apparently unheeded by the nation, his warning was not without
effect upon the training of the Regular Army.

COLONEL HENDERSON.--Military writers in the United Kingdom had also
considered the possibility of a conflict with the armed forces of
Germany, and in all their treatises the moral of the nation was passed
under review. Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, in "The Science of War," had
even envisaged a struggle in which not only the troops of Britain and
the Overseas Dominions but those of the United States would take part,
and his estimate of the moral of the race on both sides of the
Atlantic, and in both hemispheres, was fully justified by the events of
the War. Colonel Henderson found in the race something more than
toughness in its moral fibre, for he adds, "Tactical ability is the
birthright of {18} our race. . . . In a conflict on the vastest scale
(the American Civil War) the tactics of the American troops, at a very
early period, were superior to those of the Prussians in 1866. In
Strategy, controlled as it was on both sides by the civil governments
and not by the military chiefs, grave errors were committed, but on the
field of battle the racial instinct asserted itself. Nor were the
larger tactical manoeuvres even of 1870 an improvement on those of the
American campaigns. . . . But in 1878, Skobeleff, the first of
European generals to master the problem of the offensive, knew the
American War 'by heart,' and in his successful assaults on the Turkish
redoubts he followed the plan of the American generals on both sides,
when attempting to carry such positions; to follow up the assaulting
columns with fresh troops, without waiting for the first column to be
repulsed." After the Civil War, General Forrest, a cavalry leader of
the Confederate States Army, was asked to what he attributed his
success in so many actions. He replied: "Well, I reckon I got there
first with the most men," thereby stating in a nutshell the key to the
Art of War. "At Nachod, the Austrian commander had numbers on his
side, yet he sent into action part only of his forces, and it was by
numbers that he was beaten" (Marshal Foch). With regard to the moral
of the race Colonel Henderson makes this emphatic statement: "In the
last nine months of the American Civil War, time and again, according
to all precedent, one side or the other ought to have been whipped, but
it decli