STRATEGY AND TACTICS

DEFINITIONS.--Strategy and Tactics have often been treated by
non-military writers as if they were independent branches of the
soldier's profession, but while they may indeed be separately defined
it will be found in practice that they cannot be separately considered.
The theatre of operations is the kingdom of Strategy, the province of
Tactics is the field of battle, but when the battlefield is reached it
so far transcends in importance every other point in the theatre of
operations that no _tactical_ end is worth aiming at in preference to
striking with all available strength at the field force of the enemy,
and this, it will be seen, is the goal of all _strategical_
combinations. "Strategy must ever be striving for Tactical success;
Tactics must ever keep in mind the Strategical situation and must
constantly aim at creating fresh Strategical opportunities. Tactics
without Strategy resembles a man without legs; Strategy without Tactics
is like a man without arms" (General Sir E. B. Hamley). "To seek out
the enemy's armies--the centre of the adversary's power--in order to
beat and destroy them; to adopt, with this sole end in view, the
direction and tactics which will lead to it in the quickest and safest
way: such is the whole mental attitude of modern war. No Strategy can
henceforth prevail over that which aims at ensuring Tactical results,
victory by fighting" (Marshal Foch).

Local successes on the _field of battle_ often have effects that are
felt throughout the _theatre of operations_. Lord Roberts's advance on
Pretoria relieved the pressure on Kimberley in the west and on
Ladysmith in the east, and these centres are upwards of 300 miles
apart. _The {7} First Battle of the Somme_ (July 1, 1916) not only
relieved the pressure on Verdun but held in position large enemy forces
which would otherwise have been employed against our Allies in the
East. General Byng's surprise attack at Cambrai (November 20, 1917)
was followed by a determined counter-attack by the Germans on November
30, which appeared to nullify the results achieved from November 20 to
25; but "there is evidence that German divisions intended for the
Italian theatre were diverted to the Cambrai front, and it is probable
that the further concentration of German forces against Italy was
suspended for at least two weeks at a most critical period, when our
Allies were making their first stand on the Piave Line" (Sir D. Haig