implest,
limited monarchies; but all republics, all governments of law, must
impose numerous limitations and qualifications of authority, and give
many positive and many qualified rights. In other words, they must be
subject to rule and regulation. This is the very essence of free
political institutions. The spirit of liberty is, indeed, a bold and
fearless spirit; but it is also a sharp-sighted spirit, it is a
cautious, sagacious, discriminating, far-seeing intelligence; it is
jealous of encroachment, jealous of power, jealous of man. It demands
checks; it seeks for guards; it insists on securities; it intrenches
itself behind strong defences, and fortifies itself with all possible
care against the assaults of ambition and passion. It does not trust the
amiable weaknesses of human nature, and therefore it will not permit
power to overstep its prescribed limits, though benevolence, good
intent, and patriotic purpose come along with it. Neither does it
satisfy itself with flashy and temporary resistance to illegal
authority. Far otherwise. It seeks for duration and permanence. It looks
before and after; and, building on the experience of ages which are
past, it labors diligently for the benefit of ages to come. This is the
nature of constitutional liberty; and this is _our_ liberty, if we will
rightly understand and preserve it. Every free government is necessarily
complicated, because all such governments establish restraints, as well
on the power of government itself as on that of individuals. If we will
abolish the distinction of branches, and have but one branch; if we will
abolish jury trials, and leave all to the judge; if we will then ordain
that the legislator shall himself be that judge; and if we will place
the executive power in the same hands, we may readily simplify
government. We may easily bring it to the simplest of all possible
forms, a pure despotism. But a separation of departments, so far as
practicable, and the preservation of clear lines of division between
them, is the fundamental idea in the creation of all our constitutions;
and, doubtless, the continuance of regulated liberty depends on
maintaining these boundaries.
In the progress, Sir, of the governments of the United States, we seem
exposed to two classes of dangers or disturbances; one external, the
other internal. It may happen that collisions arise between this
government and the governments of the States. That case belongs to the
first
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