al influence, or high military appointments bestowed
as a reward for dirty and corrupt party services. As a military maxim,
_secure efficiency, by limiting the privileges of rank; exclude
favoritism, by giving the power of selection to boards of competent
officers, totally independent of party politics_. Such a system has been
for some time pursued in the medical department of our army; it has
produced the most satisfactory results; stupidity, ignorance, and aged
inefficiency have been _overslaughed_, and will soon entirely disappear
from that corps; they have been replaced by young men of activity,
talent, character, intelligence, and great professional skill. Is it
less important to have competent military officers to command where the
lives of thousands, the honor of our flag, the safety of the country
depend upon their judgment and conduct, than it is to have competent
surgeons to attend the sick and the wounded?

[Footnote 50: To show the working of this system of political
appointments, we would call attention to a single fact. On the formation
of an additional regiment of dragoons in 1836, _thirty_ of its officers
were appointed from civil life, and only _four_ from the graduates of
the Military Academy. Of those appointed to that regiment from civil
life, _twenty-two_ have already been dismissed or resigned, (most of the
latter to save themselves from being dismissed,) and only _eight_ of the
whole _thirty_ political appointments are now left, their places having
been mainly supplied by graduates of the Military Academy.

In case of another increase of our military establishment, what course
will our government pursue? Will it again pass by the meritorious young
officers of our army,--graduates of the Military Academy,--who have
spent ten or twelve of the best years of their life in qualifying
themselves for the higher duties of their profession, and place over
their heads civilians of less education and inferior character--men
totally ignorant of military duties, mere pothouse politicians, and the
base hirelings of party,--those who screech the loudest in favor of
party measures, and degrade themselves the most in order to serve party
ends?--and by thus devoting the army, like the custom-house and
post-office, to political purposes, will it seek to increase that vast
patronage of the executive which is already debasing individual
morality, and destroying the national character? Should any
administration of the