rved four
years, nor be made colonel till he has served three years, in the next
lower grade; no one can be made _marechal-de-camp_, lieutenant-general,
or marshal of France, till he has served two years in the next lower
grade. These numbers are all diminished one half in time of war. For the
grades of first-lieutenant and captain, two-thirds of the promotions are
by seniority, and one-third by selection; for the _chef-de-bataillon_
and _chef-d'escadron_, one-half by seniority and one-half by selection;
for all the other grades by selection only. In time of war, one-half of the
promotions to the grades of first-lieutenant and captain are filled by
selection, and all the promotions to other grades in this way. For
promotion by selection, a list of the authorized candidates for each
grade is made out every year by inspectors, and boards of examiners
appointed _ad hoc_, and the name, qualifications, and particular claim
are given of each officer admitted to the _concours_. The
recommendations of these inspectors and examiners are almost invariably
followed by the government in its selections. This combined system of
seniority and merit secures a gradual promotion to all, and at the same
time enables officers of great talents and acquirements to attain the
higher grades while still young and efficient. Merit need not,
therefore, always linger in the subaltern grades, and be held
subordinate to ignorance and stupidity, merely because they happen to be
endowed with the privileges of seniority. Moreover, government is
precluded from thrusting its own favorites into the higher grades, and
placing them over the heads of abler and better men.

If such a system of appointment were introduced into our army, and fixed
by legal enactments, and no one were allowed to receive a commission
till he had either distinguished himself in the field, or had passed an
examination before a board of competent officers, we are confident that
better selections would be made in the appointments from civil life than
have been within the last ten years by the present system of political
influence. It would scarcely be possible to make worse selections.[50]
And if the combined system of seniority and examination were pursued in
promoting the subalterns already in service, it certainly would produce
less injustice, and give greater efficiency to the army, than the
present one of exclusive seniority and brevet rank, obtained through
intrigue and politic