y successful
siege of Sebastopol.
NOTE TO CHAPTER VII.--SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
Allusion has already been made to the weakness of Mexico, resulting from
her want of sea-coast defences, as shown by the war between that
republic and the United States. This would have been still more manifest
had she possessed any thing like a commercial marine, exposed to capture
by our naval forces. As it was, the Mexican war afforded not a single
contest between ships and forts, no opposition being made to the
occupation of Mexican ports by our naval force. The only coast defence,
the castle of San Juan d'Ulica was not attacked, but after the
bombardment and capture of Vera Cruz, it surrendered without a blow.
The Crimean war, on the contrary, exhibited in a most marked degree the
importance of a well-fortified sea-coast. Notwithstanding the immense
force of the combined fleets of England and France, no naval attack was
made upon either Cronstadt or Sebastopol, and the large naval force of
Russia proved utterly useless as a defence against a maritime descent.
There was, indeed, a simulachre of a "naval cannonade" on the latter
place on the 17th of October, 1854, intended as a diversion of the
attention and strength of the garrison from the land side, where the
real struggle for predominance was going on between the besieged and the
besiegers. The inutility of this attempt was so manifest that no
serious naval attack was undertaken, notwithstanding that the allies
were ready to bring to bear upon the antiquated and ill-armed Russian
works the most powerful naval armaments the world had ever seen.
The results of this "simulachre of a naval cannonade," as it has been
called, is worthy of note. The details are taken from Major Barnard's
able pamphlet on "The Dangers and Defences of New York," and Commander
Dahlgren's interesting and valuable work on "Shells and Shell Guns."
"The allied fleet consisted of 14 French, 10 British, and 2 Turkish
ships-of-the-line (some few of which had auxiliary steam power), and a
number of side-wheel steamers to tow these; and carried in all about
2,500 guns. It was opposed by about 280 guns from the works. The fleet
kept itself (in general) at a respectable distance (from 1500 to 2000
yards); too far to inflict any material injury with its armament
(32-pounders, with a moderate proportion of 8-inch shell-guns) upon the
works;--too far to receive much from the inefficient armament of the
Russian works.
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