vent an assault of the unfinished works of defence, and to
prolong the operations of the siege. They must therefore be judged as
such, and not according to the ordinary rules applicable to contests in
the open field. At the battle of the Alma the Russians were attacked in
position, the two lines of battle being nearly parallel. According to
the original plan of attack, the Turks and Bosquet's division was to
turn the Russian left, while the main attack was made upon the centre.
But, on account of the division of command in the allied army, there was
no concert of action. The heavy column of Bosquet probably decided the
victory, although the battle was general throughout the whole line. The
English army advanced in columns of brigades at deploying distances, its
right connected with the French, and its left protected by a line of
skirmishers, of cavalry and horse artillery. With respect to the
formation and use of troops in the other battles, it may be remarked
that the charge of the English light cavalry at Balaklava was apparently
without necessity or object, and led to its inevitable destruction. In
the battle of Inkerman the Russians directed their main attack upon the
English right and centre, with false attacks upon the French left and
towards Balaklava. But these false attacks, as is usual in such cases,
were not conducted with sufficient energy and decision, and Bosquet was
thus enabled to perceive the real intentions of the enemy upon the
English portion of the line and move to its assistance. Moreover, the
main body of the Russians moved in too heavy and unwieldy masses, which
exposed them to terrible losses, and rendered impossible a rapid and
effective deployment of their numerical force. The same criticism is
applicable to their formation at the battle of the Tehernaya.

NOTE TO CHAPTER VI.--MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.

On the invasion of Mexico by the United States, the former republic had
a large army of tolerably good troops, though badly officered, still
worse equipped, and almost destitute of proper military stores; but she
was entirely wanting in two important elements of national
defence--fortifications and a navy. Her weakness was shown by the rapid
and easy conquest of almost the entire country.

We have already remarked that the fortifications of Russia confined the
theatre of war to a single point of the Crimea, and limited the military
operations of the allies to the prolonged and only partiall