asion to engage ourselves in them, since
the ditches and parapets of the enceinte were not insurmountable, as the
sequel has proved."

"The difficulty consisted in conquering the Russian army upon a
position prepared long beforehand for its defence, quite as much as in
surmounting the material obstacle of the fortification."

"Our places of arms being established at thirty metres from the
besieged works, we were able to choose our own time for action, and to
throw ourselves unexpectedly upon the enemy when the fire of our
artillery had forced him to shelter himself, up to the last minute,
behind his numerous blindages; to have gone further would have been
inviting the initiative in the attack on the part of the Russian army."

"The absence of scarp walls, which would have secured the place
from escalade, did not exercise a less influence upon the defence;
for the besieged were compelled to keep permanently at the gorges
of the works, strong reserves, in readiness to repulse the assault,
which they saw themselves menaced with from the commencement of
the siege."

"Finally, it can be remarked, that these reserves, which were decimated
night and day by the concentric fire of our batteries, were able
to issue out from the enceinte through wide debouches, without having
to pass through the narrow defiles which are formed by the drawbridges
of revetted places; they were, then, a permanent threat for the
besiegers, who were exposed to seeing their trenches unexpectedly
invaded by the greater part of the Russian army."

"Neither side, consequently, was in a position analogous to that
which is presented in the siege of a fortified place, protected from
insult by good masonry scarps.'" (Note to page 443.)

And again, page 423, the same authority remarks:

"Now, it (the Russian army) is no longer able to escape from the
concentric fires of our batteries; for, _not being protected by masonry
scarps_, it is obliged constantly to keep united strong reserves, in
order to repulse the assault with which it is at every instant menaced'"

NOTE TO CHAPTER XV.--MILITARY EDUCATION, &C.

With regard to the subjects discussed in this chapter it will, perhaps,
be sufficient to remark that the Mexican war incontestably proved the
value of the West Point Military Academy; for the superior efficiency of
properly-educated officers over those who