ir troops at the Old Fort, three plans were
open for the consideration of the Russian general: 1st. To destroy or
close the harbors of Balaklava, Kamiesch, Kazatch and Strelitzka, and,
garrisoning Sebastopol with a strong force, to occupy with the rest of
his army the strong plateau south of the city, and thus force the allies
to besiege the strong works on the north. 2d. Having closed the harbors
on the south, and secured Sebastopol from being carried by the assault
of any detachment of the allies, to operate on their left flank,
annoying and harassing them with his Cossacks, and thus delay them many
days in the difficult and precarious position which they would have
occupied. 3d. To advance with his whole force and offer them battle at
the Alma. The last and least advantageous of these plans was adopted,
and as the garrison of Sebastopol, during the battle, consisted of only
four battalions and the sailors of the fleet, it might, considering the
weakness of its works, have been easily carried by a detachment of the
allied forces.
For the allies at the Alma two plans presented themselves: 1st. To turn
the Russian left, cut him off from Sebastopol, and occupy that city in
force. 2d. To turn the Russian right, and, throwing him back upon
Sebastopol, cut him off from all external succor. Neither plan was fully
carried out. The column of General Bosquet turned the Russian left and
decided his retreat; but no strategic advantage was taken of the
victory. The battle was fought on the 20th of September, and by noon of
the 26th the allies had only advanced to the Balbeck, a distance of a
little more than ten miles in six days! On the 27th they regained their
communication with the fleet at Balaklava, without attempting to occupy
Sebastopol, and having exposed themselves to destruction by an
ill-conducted flank march. Fortunately for the allies, the Russians
failed to avail themselves of the advantages which the enemy had thus
gratuitously afforded. The fleet having entered the open harbor of
Balaklava, the allies now commenced the labor of landing and moving up
their siege material and of opening their trenches, while the Russians
prepared their fortifications on the south of Sebastopol for resisting
the operations of that gigantic siege which stands without a parallel in
history.
NOTE TO CHAPTER III.--FORTIFICATIONS.
In the war between the United States and Mexico, the latter had no
fortifications on her land fronti
|