ers, and, with the single exception of
Vera Cruz, her harbors were entirely destitute of defensive works. The
Americans, therefore, had no obstacles of this kind to overcome on three
of their lines of operation; and, when Scott had reduced Vera Cruz, his
line of march was open to the capital. Moreover, nearly every seaport on
the Gulf and Pacific coast fell into our hands without a blow. Had the
landing of Scott been properly opposed, and Vera Cruz been strongly
fortified and well defended, it would have been taken only after a long
and difficult siege. Moreover, had the invading army encountered strong
and well-defended fortifications on the line of march to Mexico, the war
would, necessarily, have been prolonged, and possibly with a different
result.

The Russian fortifications in the Baltic prevented the allies from
attempting any serious operations in that quarter, and those in the
Black Sea confined the war to a single point of the Heracleidan
Chersonese. Had Russia relied exclusively upon her fleet to prevent a
maritime descent, and left Sebastopol entirely undefended by
fortifications, how different had been the result of the Crimean war.

This subject will be alluded to again in the Notes on Sea-coast
Defences, and Permanent Fortifications.

NOTE TO CHAPTER IV.--LOGISTICS.

The war in Mexico exhibited, in a striking manner, our superiority over
the enemy in this branch of the military art. No army was better
supplied than ours in all matters of subsistence, clothing, medical and
hospital stores, and in means of transportation. Two points, however,
are worthy of remark in this connection: 1st. The great waste of
material, which resulted from the employment of raw troops under short
enlistments, and commanded by officers appointed from civil life, who
were without experience and destitute of military instruction; and, 2d.
The immense expense of transportation, which was due in part to the
above cause and in part to the employment, in the administrative
departments, of civilians who were utterly ignorant of the rules and
routine of military service. This war was conducted on the system of
magazines and provisions carried in the train of the army, or purchased
of the inhabitants and regularly paid for, forced requisitions being
seldom resorted to, and then in very moderate quantities. The wisdom of
this plan was proved by the general good order and discipline of our
troops, and the general good-will of the non