were with their
sails bent and in apparent readiness, filled with troops, and lying within
the line of fortifications; and yet this naval force effected little or
nothing against the invaders._ It is scarcely ever mentioned, being
regarded of little consequence as a means of defence; and yet the number
of its guns and the expense of its construction and support, could hardly
have fallen short of the incomplete and half-armed forts, some of which
were as ancient as the reign of Amurath!
_Algiers._--The following narrative of the attack on Algiers, in 1816,
is drawn from the reports of the English and Dutch admirals, and other
official and authentic English papers.
The attack was made by the combined fleets, consisting of five sail of
the line, eighteen or twenty frigates and smaller vessels, besides five
bomb-vessels and several rocket-boats, carrying in all about one
thousand guns. The armament of some of the smaller vessels is not given,
but the guns of those whose armaments are known, amount to over nine
hundred. The harbor and defences of Algiers had been previously surveyed
by Captain Warde, royal navy, under Lord Exmouth's direction; and the
number of the combined fleet was arranged according to the information
given in this survey--just so many ships, and no more, being taken, as
could be employed to advantage against the city, without being
needlessly exposed. Moreover, the men and officers had been selected and
exercised with reference to this particular attack.
From the survey of Captain Warde, and the accompanying map, it appears
that the armament of all the fortifications of Algiers and the vicinity,
counting the water fronts and the parts that could flank the shore, was
only two hundred and eighty-four guns of various sizes and descriptions,
including mortars. But not near all of these could act upon the fleet as
it lay. Other English accounts state the number of guns actually opposed
to the fleet at from two hundred and twenty to two hundred and thirty.
Some of these were in small and distant batteries, whereas nearly all
the fleet was concentrated on the mole-head works. (Fig. 36.) Supposing
only one broadside of the ships to have been engaged, the ratio of the
forces, as expressed by the number of guns, must have been about as 5 to
2. This is a favorable supposition for the ships; for we know that
several of them, from their position and a change of anchorage, brought
both broadsides to bear; moreov
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