e-road, through
the valley of the Chaudiere. Here is only a single road, but little
travelled, and penetrating a wide and almost uninhabited wilderness.
General Jomini says emphatically, that _a line of operations should
always offer two or three roads for the movement of an army in the
sphere of its enterprises_,--an insuperable objection to the Kennebec
route, except as a diversion to the main attack. But there are still
stronger objections to this route, than its want of feasibility for the
transportation of the main army; for even should that army succeed in
reaching Quebec in safety, the expedition would be entirely without
military results, unless that fortress could be immediately reduced,--a
contingency which would be extremely doubtful under the most favorable
circumstances; and even should we be ever so fortunate in our
operations, the siege of such a place would occupy a considerable length
of time. It would be throwing our forces along the most difficult line
of operations, against the strongest point in the enemy's line of
defence, and making the success of the whole plan depend upon the
contingency of a reduction, in a few days, of one of the strongest
fortresses in the world. What principle in military science would
justify such a plan of campaign? We are fully aware of the great
advantages to be derived from the reduction of Quebec; and we are also
aware of the great difficulties to be encountered in any attempt to
accomplish that object. It may, and probably will ere long, be made to
surrender to our arms; but it would be utter folly to base our military
operations on the contingency of a short and successful siege. By
advancing upon Montreal by the Lake Champlain route, we could cut off
the Canadian forces in the West from all reinforcements; and then, as
circumstances might direct, could besiege Quebec, or attack the enemy in
the field, or perhaps, manoeuvring as the French did at the siege of
Mantua, accomplish both objects at the same time.

We have seen that it was one of Napoleon's maxims that _an army should
choose the shortest and most direct line of operations, which should
either pierce the enemy's line of defence, or cut off his communications
with his base_. It is the opinion of men of the best military talent in
our army that the Lake Champlain line satisfies all these conditions at
the same time;--that it is the most direct, most feasible, and most
decisive line which can be pursued in cas