safeguards. The petty interests of coteries, narrow views, and misplaced
egotism, oppose this last position: nevertheless, every military man of
reflection, and every enlightened statesman, will regard its truth as
beyond all dispute; for a well-appointed staff is to an army what a
skilful minister is to a monarchy--it seconds the views of the chief,
even though it be in condition to direct all things of itself; it
prevents the commission of faults, even though the commanding general be
wanting in experience, by furnishing him good councils. How many
mediocre men of both ancient and modern times, have been rendered
illustrious by achievements which were mainly due to their associates!
Reynier was the chief cause of the victories of Pichegru, in 1794; and
Dessoles, in like manner, contributed to the glory of Moreau. Is not
General Toll associated with the successes of Kutusof? Diebitsch with
those of Barclay and Witgenstein? Gneisenau and Muffling with those of
Bluecher? Numerous other instances might be cited in support of these
assertions."

"A well-established staff does not always result from a good system of
education for the young aspirants; for a man may be a good mathematician
and a fine scholar, without being a good warrior. The staff should
always possess sufficient consideration and prerogative to be sought for
by the officers of the several arms, and to draw together, in this way,
men who are already known by their aptitude for war. Engineer and
artillery officers will no longer oppose the staff, if they reflect that
it will open to them a more extensive field for immediate distinction,
and that it will eventually be made up exclusively of the officers of
those two corps who may be placed at the disposal of the commanding
general, and who are the most capable of directing the operations of
war."

"At the beginning of the wars of the Revolution," says this able
historian elsewhere, "in the French army the general staff, which is
essential for directing the operations of war, had neither instruction
nor experience." The several adjutant-generals attached to the army of
Italy were so utterly incompetent, that Napoleon became prejudiced
against the existing staff-corps, and virtually destroyed it, drawing
his staff-officers from the other corps of the army. In his earlier
wars, a large portion of staff duties were assigned to the engineers;
but in his later campaigns the officers of this corps were particularly