a there were but seven hundred and
twenty men, and at Montreal, Three Rivers, and on the whole line of the
Sorel the whole defensive force amounted to only thirteen hundred and
thirty men, and the garrison of Quebec was so small, that no detachment
could be made without great inconvenience and danger. The fortifications
of Isle aux Noix, then emphatically the key of central Canada, was
without a garrison during nearly the whole of the first campaign. Under
these circumstances an American force of fifteen hundred or two thousand
men marching rapidly from Albany, might readily have broken the enemy's
line of defence, and cut off all Upper Canada from supplies and
reinforcements from England by way of Quebec. Let us see what course was
pursued.

On the 1st of June an army of two thousand men was collected at Dayton,
in Ohio, placed under the command of an imbecile old officer of the
Revolution, and directed by Detroit against the Canadian Peninsula. The
dilatory march, absurd movements, and traitorous surrender of Hull's
army to a British force of three hundred regulars and four hundred
militia, are but too well known. Another American army of about ten
thousand men was afterwards raised in the west; the main division of
this army under Harrison marched by three separate routes to invade
Canada by way of Malden; but they failed to reach their destination, and
wintered behind the river Portage. The Eastern army was collected at
Albany in the early part of the summer and placed under the command of
General Dearborn, another old officer of the Revolution. Instead of
pushing this force rapidly forward upon the strategic line of Lake
Champlain, the general was directed to divide it into three parts, and
to send one division against the Niagara frontier, a _second_ against
Kingston, and a _third_ against Montreal. These orders were dispatched
from Washington the 26th of June, nearly a month after Hull had begun
his march from Dayton. Dearborn's army, on the first of September,
consisted of six thousand five hundred regulars and seven thousand
militia--thirteen thousand five hundred in all: six thousand three
hundred for the Niagara frontier, two thousand two hundred at Sacketts
Harbor, and five thousand for Lake Champlain. Even with this absurd plan
of campaign and faulty division of the forces, we might have succeeded
if the general had acted with energy, so exceedingly weak were the
Canadian means of defence; but instead of ta