But we will suppose that there are no such points of land, in the inlets
to our harbors, and that we rely for defence upon a naval force
exclusively. Let us leave out of consideration the security of all our
other harbors and our commerce on the high seas, and also the importance
of having at command the means of attacking the enemy's coast, in the
absence of his fleet. We take the single case of the attack being made
on New York harbor, and that our whole fleet is assembled there. Now, if
this fleet be equal in number to the enemy, the chances of success may
be regarded as equal; if inferior, the chances are against us--for an
attacking force would probably be of picked men and of the best
materials. But here the consequences of victory are very unequal: the
enemy can lose his squadron only, while we put in peril both our
squadron and the objects it is intended to defend. If we suppose our own
naval force superior to that of the enemy, the defence of this harbor
would in all respects be complete, provided this force never left the
harbor. But, then, all the commerce of the country upon the ocean must
be left to its fate; and no attempt can be made to react offensively
upon the foe, unless we can control the chances of finding the enemy's
fleets within his ports, and the still more uncertain chance of keeping
him there; the escape of a single vessel being sufficient to cause the
loss of our harbor.

These remarks are based upon the supposition that we have but the single
harbor of New York; whereas Portland, Portsmouth, Boston, Newport, the
Delaware, the Chesapeake, Charleston, Savannah, Pensacola, Mobile, New
Orleans, and numerous other places, are equally open to attack, and
therefore must be equally defended, for we know not to which the enemy
will direct his assaults. If he come to one of these in the absence of
our fleet, his object is attained without resistance; or, if his whole
force be concentrated upon one but feebly defended, we involve both
fleet and harbor in inevitable ruin. Could our fleet be so arranged as
to meet these enterprises?

"As it cannot be denied that the enemy can select the point of attack
out of the whole extent of coast, where is the prescience that can
indicate the spot? And if it cannot be foretold, how is that ubiquity to
be imparted that shall always place our fleet in the path of the
advancing foe? Suppose we attempt to cover the coast by cruising in
front of it, shall we sweep it