it fell the French
empire erected in this country at infinite labor and expense.

At the first outbreak of the American Revolution, it was so obviously
important to get possession of the military works commanding the line of
Lake Champlain, that expeditions for this purpose were simultaneously
fitted out by Massachusetts and Connecticut. The garrisons of these
works were taken by surprise. This conquest, says Botta, the able and
elegant historian of the Revolution, "was no doubt of high importance,
but it would have had a much greater influence upon the course of the
whole war, if these fortresses, _which are the bulwarks of the
colonies_, had been defended in times following, with the same prudence
and valor with which they had been acquired."

In the campaign of 1775, an army of two thousand seven hundred and
eighty-four effective men, with a reserve of one thousand at Albany,
crossed the lake and approached the fortress of St. John's about the 1st
of September. The work was garrisoned by only about five or six hundred
regulars, and some two hundred militia. This was the only obstacle to
prevent the advance of our army into the very heart of Canada; to leave
it unreduced in rear would cut off all hope of retreat. Allen had
already made the rash and foolish attempt, and his whole army had been
destroyed, and he himself made prisoner. The reduction of this place was
therefore deemed absolutely necessary, but was not effected till the 3d
of November, and after a long and tedious siege. This delay decided the
fate of the campaign; for, although Montreal fell immediately
afterwards, the season was so far advanced that a large portion of our
troops, wearied with their sufferings from cold and want of clothing,
now demanded their discharge. The eastern division, of one thousand men
under Arnold, crossing the country by the Kennebeck and Chaudiere,
through difficulties and suffering almost unparalleled, arrived
opposite Quebec on the 9th of November. The place was at this time
almost without defence, and, had Arnold possessed a suitable pontoon
equipage, it might easily have been taken by surprise. But by the time
that the means for effecting a passage could be prepared, and a junction
could be effected between the two American armies, Quebec was prepared
to sustain their attack. The result of that attack is too well known to
require a repetition here.

Early the next season it was deemed necessary to withdraw the American